DEVELOPMENTS IN SELF RESCUE AND AIDED RESCUE

ARISING FROM MOURA NO. 2 WARDENS INQUIRY

JOINT COAL INDUSTRY COMMITTEE
QLD/NSW
DEVELOPMENTS IN SELF ESCAPE
AND AIDED RESCUE
ARISING FROM THE MOURA NO. 2 WARDENS
INQUIRY

JOINT COAL INDUSTRY COMMITTEE FROM QLD AND NSW
CHAIRMAN - MR MITCH JAKEMAN CAPRICORN COAL
TELEPHONE 07 49850202   FAX 07 49857708
DEVELOPMENTS IN SELF ESCAPE
AND AIDED RESCUE
ARISING FROM MOURA NO. 2 WARDENS INQUIRY

CHAIRMAN OF STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
MITSCH JAKEMAN
GENERAL MANAGER, CAPRICORN COAL

SELF ESCAPE
ROGER BANCROFT
SENIOR INSPECTOR, DME QLD

GLYNN MCDONALD
SENIOR INSPECTOR, DMR NSW

COMMUNICATIONS
BRUCE ROBERTSON
CHIEF MINING ENGINEER, SHELL COAL

GAS MANAGEMENT
PAUL MCKENZIE-WOOD
MANAGER TECHNICAL, NSW MINES RESCUE

AIDED RESCUE
TONY SELLARS
MANAGER, QLD MINES RESCUE

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
GARY GIBSON
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NSW MINES RESCUE

TRAINING
JOHN SARGAISON
QUEENSLAND MINERALS COUNCIL
**TASK GROUP 4 MEMBERS AND CONTRIBUTORS**

- Mr. Mitch Jakeman (Chairman)  
- Mr. John Sargaison (Secretary)  
- Mr. Bruce Robertson  
- Mr. Brian Lyne  
- Mr. Roger Bancroft  
- Mr. Bruce McKensey  
- Mr. Terry Abbott  
- Mr. Bill Allison  
- Mr. Jack Tapp  
- Dr. Cliff Mallett  
- Mr. Roger Wischusen  
- Mr. Tony Sellars  
- Mr. Gary Gibson  
- Mr. Paul Mckenzie-Wood  
- Dr. Chris Rawling (former Chairman)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mitch Jakeman</td>
<td>Capricorn Coal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Sargaison</td>
<td>QMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bruce Robertson</td>
<td>Shell Coal Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Brian Lyne</td>
<td>DME, Qld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Roger Bancroft</td>
<td>DME, Qld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bruce McKensey</td>
<td>DMR, NSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Terry Abbott</td>
<td>DMR, NSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bill Allison</td>
<td>CFMEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jack Tapp</td>
<td>CFMEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Cliff Mallett</td>
<td>CSIRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Roger Wischusen</td>
<td>AMIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Tony Sellars</td>
<td>Qld Mines Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Gary Gibson</td>
<td>NSW Mines Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Paul Mckenzie-Wood</td>
<td>NSW Mines Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Chris Rawling (former Chairman)</td>
<td>QCT Resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD .................................................................................................................. 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................................... 7

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 16

2. OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................... 17

3. SCOPE ..................................................................................................................... 18

4. DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY ........................................................................... 20

5. SELF ESCAPE - EMERGENCY ESCAPE SYSTEMS ............................................. 23
   5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 23
   5.2 ESCAPE STRATEGY .......................................................................................... 23
   5.3 EARLY WARNING ............................................................................................... 24
   5.4 SELF RESCUERS ............................................................................................... 25
   5.5 COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................................... 27
   5.6 ESCAPEWAYS .................................................................................................... 28
   5.7 GUIDANCE SYSTEMS ....................................................................................... 28
   5.8 CHANGE-OVER STATIONS .............................................................................. 29
   5.9 REFUGE CHAMBERS ......................................................................................... 30
   5.10 TRAINING ........................................................................................................ 31
   5.11 EVACUATION MANAGEMENT PLAN ............................................................. 31

6. COMMUNICATIONS - RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ..................... 35

7. GAS MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES ......................................................................... 40
   7.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 40
   7.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE .................................................................................... 41

8. AIDED RESCUE ...................................................................................................... 51
   8.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 51
   8.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE ..................................................................................... 51
   8.3 REFUGE CHAMBERS USED IN UNDERGROUND MINING ............................... 51
      8.3.1 General Background ................................................................................... 51
      8.3.2 Key Points of Overall Strategy ................................................................... 52
      8.3.3 System Requirements ............................................................................... 55
      8.3.4 Industry Developments - Australia ............................................................ 60
   8.4 MICROSEISMIC DETECTION SYSTEMS .......................................................... 62
      8.4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 62
      8.4.2 The MSHA Seismic Location System ........................................................ 62
      8.4.3 Microseismic Application for Australia .................................................... 63
      8.4.4 Summary ..................................................................................................... 67
   8.5 LARGE DIAMETER DRILLING ............................................................................ 67
      8.5.1 Existing knowledge ..................................................................................... 67
      8.5.2 Overseas ....................................................................................................... 68
      8.5.3 Summary ..................................................................................................... 69
      8.5.4 Recommendations ...................................................................................... 69
      8.5.5 Enclosed Borehole Information Tables ...................................................... 71
   8.6 RESCUE EMERGENCY VEHICLE ..................................................................... 86
      8.6.1 Existing Knowledge ..................................................................................... 86
      8.6.2 Feasibility of the Rescue Emergency Vehicle ............................................ 86
      8.6.3 Development of the Rescue Vehicle ............................................................ 87
      8.6.4 REV Engine and Fuel System ..................................................................... 88
      8.6.5 Summary ..................................................................................................... 91

9. MINES RESCUE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT .................................................. 92
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION - INCIDENT MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>VENTILATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL MODELLING</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>SELECTION MATRIX FOR INDUSTRY SYSTEM</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS BEING CONSIDERED</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS GUIDELINES</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>COMPUTER-BASED EMERGENCY DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

Although the coal industry in Australia continues to expand and chase improvements in technology, equipment, training and safety, the industry still suffers from underground incidents which have tragic consequences for individuals and families. The responsibility is for all stakeholders, employers, employees and support agencies to remove causes and behaviors which create such incidents. This will make underground coal mining safer for all personnel.

The fundamental mind set to safety performance has changed dramatically over the last 15 years. During the early 1980's, the recognition started that the industry safety performance was very poor. At the end of that decade and by the early 1990's many large companies, together with government and the unions were supporting safety training programs to reduce Lost Time Injuries - the high level measure of safety. These programs produced varying levels of success, but developed a sceptism amongst some parts of the industry where the results were managed not the risks.

Several incidents occurred in the early to mid 1990's which showed that the rate of change and the approaches to the management of safety were not good enough. The industry started to look at Risk Management and the need to formally quantify the risks, controls and protection that was needed to improve safety performance.

The Wardens Inquiry into the accident at Moura No. 2 in 1994 highlighted the urgency to review rescue operations for person's underground.

A coal industry committee, already set up to review the fundamentals of coal mines rescue, was given the task to review escape and rescue options by the Queensland Chief Inspector of Coal Mines. The committee consisted of a broad cross section of major stakeholders of the NSW and Queensland coal industry. The process of review was fundamental, exhaustive and widespread in its scope. It was clearly appreciated by all the committee members that escape and rescue options for mine personnel could be substantially updated and improved. The
mind set previously held, that Mines Rescue was the Cavalry charging over the hill to rescue people, needed to be changed in response to recent major incidents. This change would encompass the techniques, equipment, design of mines and the role of the rescue service.

The work has taken 2.5 years to get to this stage and will require the stakeholders in this industry to implement the recommendations, complete R & D projects and participate in the information sharing that will be necessary to sustain these improvements. I would like to thank all those who have contributed including the sub committee participants. The active involvement, participation and dedication of everyone, has recognised only the need to improve safety without the barriers of state, political or industrial interference. It is encouraging to know that we can work together for the common good when the need is greatest.

Mitch Jakeman
Chairman of Task Group 4
Developments in Self Escape and Aided Rescue
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The inquiry into the 1994 accident at Moura No. 2 Colliery included in its findings that mine escape and rescue options for persons in underground coal mines were in need of review. It recommended the establishment of industry working groups to report to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (Qld) on matters including escape strategy and life support for escape from mines.

Task Group No. 4, comprising industry stakeholders from Qld and NSW, has examined issues relevant to escape and rescue from Australian underground coal mines and formulated recommendations and guidelines in response to the set objectives and scope.

With regard to existing practice it was determined that:

- for persons underground at the time of a major incident, escape options are limited and there is no consistent strategy in place for rescue of mineworkers across the industry;
- filter self rescuers have a limited application in mine emergencies;
- knowledge of conditions underground after an accident is insufficient for accurate assessment of the mine environment;
- rescue strategies require upgrading.

The diversity of mine configurations and potential emergency scenarios led the Task Group to determine six (6) critical issues:

1. Self escape

There is a primary need to enhance the capabilities of underground persons to effect their own rescue - i.e. "self escape". This is to be achieved by the provision of facilities in mines, training of mineworkers and management and the development of generic and mine-specific escape strategies.
Escape routes, alternative routes and facilities are to be planned, developed and equipped as part of Self Escape Management Plans. An oxygen-based escape system is required with the following attributes:

- all persons to wear self contained self rescuers;
- replacement SCSR caches provided at suitably located changeover stations;
- use of refuge chambers where appropriate.

2. Communication Introduction

A generic strategy is required to establish the location and condition of person’s underground after an incident and to maintain communication during aided rescue. The key areas requiring development are:

- guidance systems for self rescue;
- communications post incident;
- determination of status of all personnel underground after an incident.

These will require technology transfer and some research. An industry expert committee has been formed to champion these initiatives.

3. Gas Management

Gas management guidelines are established for effective and safe incident control. This should look at the design and location of monitoring systems, the integrity and interpretation of information, mines rescue requirements for both underground and to the surface and the training/competency of people and systems.
4. Aided Rescue

There is also scope for intervention, assistance and rescue of underground persons by surface personnel, i.e. - "aided rescue". However, significant changes to rescue strategies are required in order to make use of modern technology to increase the chances of successful aided rescue. The determination of the status of conditions and personnel underground are key areas requiring improvement. Rescue options and post incident control strategies need to be appropriate for the incident.

Areas that need to be researched and developed are a new mines rescue vehicle, consideration of large diameter boreholes for rescue where appropriate and the upgrade of environmental monitoring and communications equipment needed for rescue teams.

Aided Rescue Management Plans are required at mines to ensure that a coordinated and effectively-resourced rescue response can be mounted in order to maximise the chances of saving persons trapped in a mine. Plans should address:

- means to establish and monitor the status of persons underground;
- means to establish, monitor and assess conditions in the mine;
- establishing post-incident controls;
- rescue options;
- training for aided rescue.

There is a clear need for the mines rescue services to revise their operating strategies and infrastructure to accommodate the new ways of aiding rescue proposed by this report.

5. Incident Management

Provision of new escape and rescue systems will be of limited value unless the people in danger or participating in rescue can make the appropriate decisions when confronted with an emergency situation. Planning, preparation and training for such emergencies is essential to improving their chances of survival.
Incident Management allows those managing the incident to follow decision criteria to minimise risk and conduct a successful emergency.

6. **Training Developments**

Every underground mine should develop a Self Escape Management Plan as part of a Safety Management Plan to provide all persons underground with the capability to reach a place of safety, recognising the difficult environmental conditions following an incident. Training initiatives in the form of new generic training resources and training guidelines should be developed to support the use of these plans.

Specific recommendations aimed at improving capabilities in these six critical areas have been made. These recommendations promote the Task Group's proposed vision for response to incidents at mines in the future:

*All persons underground at the time of an incident shall be trained, equipped and able to make an escape to the surface, or place of safety, if physically capable. Monitoring, communications systems and other new rescue technology will provide surface personnel with the capability to safely deploy aided rescue measures to rescue those unable to self-escape.*

Further development, prioritisation, management and funding of initiatives in this area require the continued involvement of industry stakeholders. At the end of 1996 there were several urgent initiatives that could be quickly implemented by industry to bring about improvements in emergency escape and rescue.
7. Specific Recommendations

The specific recommendations of the Moura No. 2 Warden's Report Implementation, Task Group 4 Report (1996) are listed below.

Recommendation 1
Every underground mine should develop a Self Escape Management Plan and an Aided Rescue Management Plan. The interrelationship between the Escape and Rescue Plans must be examined and incorporated into the Mine Safety Management Plan.

Recommendation 2
a) A generic industry training resource package for self escape and aided rescue should be developed.

b) Guidelines for mine specific training in self escape and aided rescue should be developed.

Recommendation 3
Every underground mine should establish an escapeway from all parts of the mine to the surface or to an alternative place of safety. A detailed risk analysis of proposed escapeways will need to be undertaken and strategies developed to control risks.

Recommendation 4
From each part of every underground mine, there should be at least one route, other than an escapeway, which enable self escape to the surface or an alternative place of safety. A conveyor roadway or a return roadway are not precluded for this purpose.

Recommendation 5
An oxygen-based self escape system should be provided for all persons underground.

Recommendation 6
Each person underground should be equipped with, and carry on their person at all times, a self contained self rescuer (SCSR).
Recommendation 7
An industry committee/forum (technical experts and operators) should be established to coordinate the advancement of capabilities to alert, to communicate with, and to assess the status of underground persons during a mine emergency.

Recommendation 8
Fixed tube bundles and gas chromatographs should be made available at all mines as the primary method of measuring post incident mine atmospheric conditions.

Recommendation 9
Research into the development of robust telemetric sensors for gas analysis and other environmental parameters, over the ranges existing after incidents, should be prioritised.

Recommendation 10
A mine emergency reconnaissance vehicle should be made available for all mines for use in emergencies.

Recommendation 11
Both pre-installed and post-incident boreholes should be considered when developing Aided Rescue Management Plans.

Recommendation 12
Rescue teams should be provided with state of the art environmental monitoring equipment and on-line communications.

Recommendation 13
Equipment should be made available to ascertain the physical status of the mine environment (including temperature, humidity, pressure etc.) using boreholes, and reconnaissance vehicles.
Recommendation 14
A demonstration of the capabilities of microseismic monitoring technology to detect, locate and monitor roof falls, outbursts and fires should be carried out.

Recommendation 15
The capability to model ventilation and the mine environment following an incident should be available at mines.

Recommendation 16
Guidelines, common to both Qld and NSW, should be developed for integrated emergency preparedness involving mine operators and emergency services.

Recommendation 17
Industry should develop an effective computer-based emergency decision support system for incident management and training.

Recommendation 18
A steering committee should be established to encourage and oversee the development of emergency rescue vehicles.

Recommendation 19
Mines should consider the need for refuge chambers when developing Self Escape and Aided Rescue Management Plans.

Recommendation 20
Aided rescue using shafts and/or large diameter boreholes should be considered for inclusion in mines Aided Rescue Management Plans where viable.

Recommendation 21
a) A generic industry training resource package for self escape and aided rescue should be developed for mineworkers and management/others.
8. **Status of Recommendations - 1 January 1998.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 1</td>
<td>Legislated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 2a, 2b</td>
<td>Likely to be a six month development process during 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 3</td>
<td>Accommodated within each mine's emergency evacuation hazard management plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 4</td>
<td>Accommodated within each mine's emergency evacuation hazard management plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 5</td>
<td>Legislated in Queensland, pending in NSW (not necessarily oxygen based).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 6</td>
<td>Legislated in Queensland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 7</td>
<td>Have met twice - will continue to meet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 8</td>
<td>Not Legislated - chromatographs are in place at all Queensland mines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 9</td>
<td>Research not prioritised - mentioned in gas management guidelines - requires further thought for promoting research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 10</td>
<td>In place - NUMBAT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 11</td>
<td>Guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 12</td>
<td>Dealt with in gas management guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 13</td>
<td>Reconnaissance vehicle - work proceeding - borehole equipment available for purchase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 14</td>
<td>Research planned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 15</td>
<td>Needs to be proactively energised - C. Mallet to follow up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 16</td>
<td>Guidelines are being developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 17</td>
<td>Recommendations for R &amp; D are being developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 18</td>
<td>Done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 19</td>
<td>Done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 20</td>
<td>In progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 21a, 21b</td>
<td>Six month project for development 1998.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In conclusion, many of these recommendations have been actioned throughout the industry through legislative amendments, the development of Safety Management Plans, changes to the Mines Rescue Services and further development of research projects. The aim is to continue our focus on Risk Management and not become complacent with improving results. The potential risks in mining like Mother Nature are unforgiving and severely penalise those that become neglectful.

9. Future Direction

It was recommended that the industry consider how best the initiatives in this report can be sustained in the future. The committee recommends in the first instance that existing established committees overseeing statutory and mines rescue matters expand their brief to accommodate developments in self-escape and emergency rescue.

It was also suggested that the currency of development in this field might best be maintained and communicated to industry via an annual report.

This report would cover relevant developments in R & D, outcomes and learnings from annual emergency exercises, and knowledge gained from incidents in Australia and overseas.
1. INTRODUCTION

The Warden's Inquiry into the Moura No. 2 incident contained a number of findings and recommendations aimed at reducing the likelihood of future accidents. Some of the recommendations called for further investigation, analysis and the development of safe operating guidelines. Several Task Groups, representing various industry stakeholders, were subsequently assembled comprising members with relevant experience and skills to determine the required guidelines and report back to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (Qld).

Five such Task Groups were convened, with Task Group No. 4 allotted the task of developing guidelines in response to Recommendations 9 and 10 of the Warden's Report. These related to the development of an Escape Strategy for persons involved in an incident.

An industry panel with suitable membership had been previously formed to develop an industry plan for enhanced mines rescue following an industry forum which considered the future of the "NUMBAT" remote underground reconnaissance vehicle. This committee was allotted the additional specific tasks required of Task Group No. 4.

This report presents the recommendations of Task Group No. 4 for consideration by the Chief Inspector, and the industry in general.
2. OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives for Task Group No. 4 were:

1. To recommend guidelines to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (Qld) on self rescue escape;
2. To present a report to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (Qld) addressing issues identified in Recommendations 9 and 10 of the Moura No. 2 Wardens Report.

These recommendations were as follows:

Recommendation 9
"............... it is recommended that a representative industry working party, containing appropriate expertise, be convened by the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines and that group be charged with the development of guidelines for the industry covering life support for escape."

Recommendation 10
"......it is recommended that the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines set up a working party, comprising persons with appropriate knowledge and experience, to examine and report on a range of issues relating to emergency escape facilities.

The group should investigate means whereby persons in any part of a mine, who are subject to disorientation or severely impaired visibility, are able to find their way out of the mine. Consideration should also be given by the group to the potential role for motorised transport in emergency escape arrangements."
3. SCOPE

The scope of the study by Task Group No. 4 was established as follows:

i) to develop a strategy for enhancing emergency escape and rescue for personnel with respect to the hazards associated with fires, explosions and explosive / irrespirable atmospheres in coal mines;

ii) to develop guidelines for the establishment and use at underground coal mines of an appropriate self escape system from all underground work areas which is independent of external or mechanised emergency support systems;

iii) to develop recommendations leading to an effective aided rescue system for underground coal mines;

iv) to prepare a report addressing issues identified in Recommendations 9 and 10 of the Moura No. 2 Warden's Report, for presentation to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (Qld), by 28 June, 1996.

v) prepare a report to develop guidelines for self escape, gas management, incident management and establish training competencies and establish research projects for communication and aided rescue by Jan 1, 1998.

The report is to address a broad range of issues relating to emergency escape facilities at a coal mine. Subjects to be addressed should include:

- assistance to visually impaired or disoriented person;
- potential for powered emergency transport;
- use of large diameter drill holes and possible emergency recovery routes;
- rescue chambers or self contained life support refuges;
- use of designated escapeways as part of the mine design;
- communications options to determine the status of person underground;
Development in Self Escape and Aided Rescue
Arising from the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry

- identification of any limitations on the dimensions and operating range of emergency vehicles;
- identification of the maximum distance an emergency vehicle may have to travel in any Queensland underground coal mine (currently operating) within the next 15 years.

The committee's focus spans from immediately after the initiation of an emergency incident up until the time that all personnel have been recovered from the mine, or when the emergency control team has determined that the emergency is over. The retrieval of any bodies, obtaining of evidence or recovering the mine are not considered emergency activities and should be conducted as a pre-planned operation using a risk management approach.
4. DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY

The Task Group has considered the post incident response issues in the context of the structure illustrated in the flow chart below (Fig 1.1). This flowchart tracks the development of an emergency from the incident until the mine returns to operational status or closure. It also recognises that in order to effectively prepare for incident response, management plans, rescue facilities and training need to be put in place. The critical elements of this process studied by the Task Group are the Self Escape and Aided Rescue components as well as aspects of pre-incident preparation.

Table 1.1 illustrates the core issues relevant to the development of an effective escape and rescue strategy.
The issues have been broadly categorised into those covering escape strategy, personnel status, environmental conditions, control strategy and rescue options. Several of the issues overlap these categories as addressed in the detailed sections of the report. Some issues have been extensively dealt with by other task groups (e.g. seals, inertisation, re-entry) and are listed here only for completeness.

The Task Group adopted an integrated systems approach to escape and rescue which resulted in a number of recommendations which will require prioritised implementation. Several recommendations require research and development, or embody training initiatives, some require a legislative response, and most require further industry collaboration. It is recognised that until all of the elements identified are available, the recommended system may not achieve its full potential.

It was also recognised that individual mines may develop specific plans that are subsets of a total rescue system. It is therefore up to individual operations to identify, develop and implement rescue systems appropriate for their needs in conjunction with relevant
stakeholders. It is vital, however that the industry adopts a uniform approach to the upgrading of escape and rescue strategies in order to maximise the potential for incident survival and response.

Strategy development was considered for current as well as future coal mine scenarios. In looking ahead, it was considered impractical to forecast the nature of coal mine layouts, size and operating environments beyond 5 to 10 years, during which time similar characteristics to those in existence today and existing mines will simply increase in area and distance from surface entries. Some may add man-winding shafts. It is expected that escape and rescue strategies developed today will be continuously reviewed and amended to maintain relevance.
5. SELF ESCAPE - EMERGENCY ESCAPE SYSTEMS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Issues relevant to self-escape from Australian underground coalmines have been examined and recommendations and guidelines formulated in response to the terms of reference and scope for Task Group 4. The issues relate to the implementation of Task Group 4 recommendations 1, 2a, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 21a, 21b (see pp 10-12).

Self Escape - Emergency Escape Systems, covers the major points arising from the work of both the Queensland and New South Wales working groups, and the results of a study of overseas escape strategies that was undertaken by the NSW working group.

W. Barraclough, BHP Coal
R. Bancroft, Dept. Minerals and Energy Qld
P. Eade, BHP Coal
G. Dwyer, United Mineworker's Union
G. Fawcett, Dept. Mineral Resources
G. Macdonald, Dept. of Mineral Resources
P. McKenzie-Wood, Mines Rescue Service NSW
F. O'Connor, Appin Colliery

5.2 ESCAPE STRATEGY

Evaluation of the various factors involved identified a number of major elements that need to be addressed in the development of an emergency escape system that enables persons to escape safely.

Some of these elements are:

- Early Warning;
- Self Rescue Apparatus;
Development in Self Escape and Aided Rescue
Arising from the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry

- Communications;
- Guidance Systems / Lifelines;
- Escapeways / Transport;
- Refuge Chambers / Changeover Stations;
- Training of personnel;
- Safety Management Plan for Evacuation.

The escape of persons underground will be enhanced by the use of a planned strategy that has been developed by consideration of these elements and recognition of the potentially difficult circumstances a person could encounter following an incident. Importantly the strategy will include the realisation that the mobilisation of rescue personnel could take time. The initial reactions of persons underground to an incident situation are a significant determinant on their survival. Planning, preparation and training for such emergencies are essential components required to improving their likelihood of survival.

5.3 EARLY WARNING

The role of an early warning system is to sense the first signs of fire or explosion and communicate an alarm so that evacuation of the mine or part can take place. Control measures taken at the earliest possible time would allow egress through reasonably smoke free escapeways and maximise effective escape.

Carbon Monoxide and smoke sensing systems offer considerable potential for early and more reliable fire detection than do other available systems.

A control system must be established to receive and analyse data on the underground environment. The system must include decision making protocols and enable control to be maintained and action to be coordinated during an emergency.

Consideration should be given to the incorporation of a communication system throughout the mine that can be used to immediately notify underground employees in all areas of the mine of the need to evacuate. The system should have the ability to provide employees with
Development in Self Escape and Aided Rescue Arising from the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry

incident details and directions. Principal systems include telephone, traditional two-way radio, ground induction and leaky feeders.

Western Australian, Canadian and Mount Isa Mines metalliferous mines have introduced systems to release stench gas to the ventilation system to initiate emergency procedures.

Computer generated emergency alert systems are available where recorded messages can be transmitted to localities on an at risk basis. The Revmaux (HBL) mine in France utilises such a system with a maximum of 10 localities alerted at one time. An alert immediately triggers the escape procedure. A similar type of system has been used in a Queensland colliery.

The Personal Emergency Device referred to as “PED”, through the earth system is capable of sending radio messages from the surface to wearers of receiving units on a mine-wide basis after an incident. The PED’s utility is limited by the inability to return signals from the wearer to the surface. Medium frequency partially inductive systems (e.g. Rimtech, Taiheiyo) provide increased potential for survival after an incident because of the robust nature of the wave carriers used (pipes, cables etc.). Prototype units for locating trapped miners have been developed overseas but their application is limited to short range, direct line of sight and restrictive circumstances.

5.4 SELF RESCUERS

Filter type self rescuers were introduced into the coal mining industry in the 1960’s in response to many fatalities that had arisen due to conveyor belt fires (e.g. Creswell Colliery, UK, 1950 - 80 fatalities). They are only effective where sufficient oxygen is present in the atmosphere.

The introduction of fire resistant anti-static conveyor belts, fire resistant oils, reduced use of timber supports and improved environmental monitoring technology has reduced the risk of mine fires and hence the principal reason for the use of filter type self-rescuers.
An explosion occurring in the vicinity of a working face is now the principal hazard that require the use of a self-rescuer.

In reviewing previous explosion incidents, it was found that due to the re-content of parts of the mine atmosphere following explosions, the use of a filter type rescuer would not have enabled persons to escape.

For this reason, it is considered essential that all persons underground be equipped with a self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR), i.e. a self-rescuer that provides the wearer with respirable air.

There are many brands and types of SCSR's currently available. These are mainly manufactured in either Europe, the USA or South Africa, each country having different testing and approval criteria. The only international standard currently available for the testing of chemical type (KO₂) oxygen self-rescuers is EN 401 (B.S., 1993). The testing of compressed oxygen self-rescuers in Australia is covered by AS/NZ 1716 (DMR, 1996).

Because of the differing test criteria used, and the confusion that this can create when evaluating different brands, EN 401 has been recommended as the standard for the testing of chemical oxygen SCSR's. EN 401 is being adopted until an Australian standard is developed.

Immediately following an underground mine explosion, visibility can be significantly reduced causing irritation to eyes in smoke laden atmospheres. This impairs the self-escape of persons who can become disoriented. Combined with the lack of communication, serious limitations are placed on the ability to effect escape.

South African research & experience with chemical oxygen SCSR's has shown that poor visibility and disorientation can reduce the distance travelled to 60% of that expected under normal conditions.

Many cases have been cited where persons have not been able to find their self-contained self-rescuer immediately adjacent to them (DMR, 1996).
Due to this disorientation and lack of visibility, it is essential that all people underground carry an SCSR with them at all times.

Another factor that can play a major part in the escape of persons using self-rescuers is body mass. This subject is dealt with comprehensively by Paul McKenize-Wood in his paper “Deployment of Self-Contained Self-Rescuers in Coal Mines”.

There is a requirement in all Australian underground coalmines for the use of approved self-rescuers. The minimum requirement in New South Wales for filter type self-rescuers and from January 1, 1998 self-contained oxygen self-rescuers have been required in Queensland.

5.5 COMMUNICATIONS

There is a need for a communications system that would survive an incident and provide ongoing two-way communications between escaping or trapped miners and rescue personnel on the surface. The system should be compatible with the type of self-rescue breathing apparatus to be used and the likely escape or refuge options available to survivors. As power to the mine is likely to be interrupted during an incident, self-contained battery powered backup should be integral to the system. Whilst voice is the highest priority for transfer, systems which can also transmit data and video signals should be encouraged to assist the rescue process.

The minimum coverage requirement is for a communication system to be established along escape routes.

The location and tracking of all persons (and most vehicles) in underground mines should also be considered in any escape system. Effective two-way voice communication will contribute to this requirement but more efficient electronic systems should be pursued.

Current communications systems for underground mines are limited for emergency conditions but there are commercial leaky feeder based systems which have good potential provided that transmission networks can be stiffened to survive incidents or equipped with
satisfactory redundancy. Low frequency “through the earth” technology is being researched for underground-to-surface capability. Once robust networks can be demonstrated, value-adding technology such as personnel and vehicle tracking and personnel status monitoring can be deployed. Management plans must embrace the support of such communication systems and link into emergency protocols and controls.

5.6 ESCAPEWAYS

Rescue response following an incident involves a period of time that, in most circumstances, requires people underground to attempt an organised escape, rather than await rescue. In Australian collieries, the distance from the working face to the surface can be considerable, and in many cases the seam grade can be quite steep. These escape route difficulties, allied with the expected problems of disorientation and poor visibility, give rise to a requirement for a roadway to be established in each mine that meets the criteria of good trafficability.

This roadway should, as far as practicable, be capable of maintaining a respirable atmosphere that is free from fumes and airborne dust, after an explosion or fire. To achieve this, the escapeway should be an intake airway, protected from damage by being segregated from other roadways, with stoppings capable of withstanding low intensity explosions.

Vehicular escape would, in most circumstances, afford the best chance of persons making a rapid escape from the mine, and escapeways should be designed to maximise the likelihood of facilitating vehicular escape, without precluding or endangering passage by foot.

5.7 GUIDANCE SYSTEMS

To assist in gaining access to escapeways, and in guiding persons along escapeways in conditions of low visibility, clear guidance systems that will survive an incident are required. Knotted ropes with directional cones fitted (lifelines) have been developed for this purpose. More recently, battery-powered guidance systems, such as the “MOSES” system in South Africa and “LEADLIGHT” in Australia incorporating directionally discriminating audible pitches and flashing LED’s have been developed to provide clearer guidance. The Australian
system is also developing a tracking tag system which can be integrated or stand alone to determine where personnel are in the escapeways or mine workings.

Use of the term “second means of egress” is commonly applied to return airways, with little thought being given to which is the most desirable escape route. In emergency exercises involving different scenarios, employees invariably attempted to escape via the returns, even when this may have been the most inappropriate route. The concept of “second means of egress” as the primary escape route should be replaced by the concept of an “escapeway”.

Mine management should carefully consider which airway would make the most suitable escapeway. Because of the need to maintain a respirable atmosphere, the risk of fire in this roadway should be reduced to a minimum. This could be achieved by restricting the use of equipment in this roadway to those items that are either fitted with fire suppression devices, or which incorporate a fail safe system to prevent the outbreak of fire.

5.8 CHANGE-OVER STATIONS

Dependent upon the distance of the working areas from the surface and the duration of any self contained self-rescuers (SCSRs) to be carried, the provision of underground caches of SCSRrs must be considered to facilitate the escape of persons to the surface. The number and separation distance between caches should be based on the assumption that the mine atmosphere is irrespirable all of the way to the surface, and that visibility throughout the mine will be very poor.

Caches installed throughout a mine should be constructed so that they are protected from the effects of low intensity explosions. Persons exchanging SCSR’s should be able to do so in a safe manner. This could be accomplished by being able to exchange SCSR’s in irrespirable atmospheres or by the provision of changeover stations equipped with respirable air. Consideration should also be given to equipping changeover stations with communication facilities, capable of surviving an incident, to facilitate escape co-ordination.
In addition to designated caches located at strategic locations in the mine, consideration should be given to the provision of either a cache of SCSR's or some other system of respirable air, on board personnel vehicles. There are compressed air systems now available, comprising a storage cylinders and a number of face masks connected to a common supply regulator, that could meet this need.

5.9 REFUGE CHAMBERS

Refuge chambers have an accepted place in rescue strategies in South African coalmines where workers are instructed to make their way to the section refuge chamber. This is mainly due to the large aerial extent of the mine workings, the generally shallow depth of workings (enabling borehole recovery in the event of a disaster) and the differing cultural backgrounds and experience of the mine workers.

The majority of opinions sought on the use of refuge chambers in Australian coalmines indicates that Australian coal miners, in the absence of incident information, would attempt to reach the mine surface rather than stay underground in a Refuge Chamber.

In the first instance, escape systems should be provided to enable persons to escape to the surface of the mine or alternative place of safety. Operators should, however, examine their own circumstances and possible scenarios to ascertain whether or not there is a place for refuge chambers in their Self Escape Management Plan.

Current thinking indicates that it is very unlikely that rescue teams will be sent into a mine with explosive or toxic concentrations of gas, and that miners will generally need to effect their own rescue.

For this reason it is believed that regardless of whether a Refuge Chamber or a Change Over Station is used, the system should be mainly designed so that miners have a safe place to assemble.
The Refuge Chamber or Change Over Station should preferably be supplied with a respirable atmosphere and means of communication to the surface so that people can plan their escape and change from one self rescuer to another in safety.

While the system may be best designed to provide assistance to a safe and timely escape, it needs to be recognised that there may be injured persons that are unable to escape from the mine, but may be able to reach a place of safety if one is provided.

5.10 TRAINING

Provision of oxygen self-rescuers, early warning systems and escapeways will be of limited value unless the people attempting escape can make the appropriate decisions when confronted with an emergency situation. It is essential that all mineworkers be given adequate and regular training in all aspects of the mine escape system.

Training exercises should entail more than just travelling through the second means of egress or escapeway.

A feature of both USA and South African mineworker training is participation in regular evacuation exercises, often under simulated conditions of disorientation or low visibility.

5.11 EVACUATION MANAGEMENT PLAN

Consideration of all the various aspects of the mine when examined in the light of the previously enumerated factors should be incorporated into a mine evacuation or Self-Escape Management Plan.

The plan should be developed using the criteria established in guidelines for Queensland Safety Management Plans or the New South Wales Risk Management handbook for the Mining Industry MDG 1010.
This would provide all persons underground with the capability to reach a place of safety, recognising the difficult environmental conditions likely to be encountered following an underground incident.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Person Wearable SCSR Task Force, Final Report by Jeffery H. Kravitz, Chief, Mine Emergency Operations, Mine Safety and Health Administration and John G. Kovac, Supervisory Mechanical Engineer, USBM.

Federal Register; May 15, 1992; Part II; 30 CFR Parts 70 and 75 Safety Standards for Underground Coal Mine Ventilation; Rule.


Physiological Responses of Miners to Emergency; Volume I, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Stressors.

Physiological Responses of Miners to Emergency, Volume II, Appendices.

An Examination of Major Mine Disasters in the United States and a Historical Summary of MSHA's Mine Emergency Operations Program by Jeffery H. Kravitz.


Chamber of Mine of South Africa - Position paper on performance and life potential of Self-Contained Self-Rescuers.

European Structured EN401 - 1993 Chemical Oxygen (KO2) escape apparatus.


Deployment of self-contained self rescuers in coal mines P McKenzie Wood et al.


Various discussion papers by NSW Underground Emergency Systems working group.

Report on Overseas study into escape systems R Bancroft Qld DME 1997.

6. COMMUNICATIONS - RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

The task group concluded that communications following underground incidents could be enhanced through several initiatives some of which required demonstration and some which required further research and development.

The communication sub-committee was:

B. Roberston (Chair), Shell Coal Pty Ltd
J. Ruble, Moranbah North
T. Hancock, Moranbah North
G. Eaton, BHP
T. Willmott, Dartbrook
D. Decker, CSIRO
J. Jacka, CSIRO
R. Wischusen, AMIRA
D. Pomfret, Power Coal

The recommendations and actions were:

- Develop alert/alarm systems – options to be considered and consolidated;
- Investigate “reverse PED” concept – develop research proposal;
- Develop robust telephone nodes – cooperate with suppliers to demonstrate;
- Test escapeway medium frequency inductive systems – trials;
- Reinforce mine-wide radio networks – trials;
- Demonstrate tracking – trials;
- Facilitate communication between employees – evaluate options with SCSR manufacturers;
- Develop distress beacons – review prototypes, develop research projects if feasible;
- Establish protocols – for industry panel;
- Develop vital signs monitoring – source transducers, trial.
An industry committee/forum was established to examine each of these recommendations and propose action plans for implementation. The committee determined that:

- Traditional alert/alarm systems were not ideal for coal mines but that a satisfactory full time radio-based communications system would satisfy this need;
- A “through-the-earth” radio system which allowed messages to be sent from underground to surface was highly desirable and potentially feasible but required significant development. An ACARP grant was made to CSIRO Division of Radiophysics to develop such technology;
- Reinforcement of telephone and radio systems through installation of redundant links to surface via boreholes was seen as a viable strategy and trials were to be encouraged. CSIRO is developing a cellular system of low cost radio repeaters which provides improved redundancy and reliability by virtue of overlapping cells;
- MF inductive radio systems suffer from voice quality and range but may be usefully deployed in emergency escapeways; suitable manufacturers should be encouraged to demonstrate capabilities;
- Tracking of personnel and equipment was commercially available but depended on network reliability; demonstrations would be forthcoming;

It was necessary to consider how escaping persons could effectively communicate with each other when wearing SCSRs; this was an issue for consideration by manufacturers and mine managers, but should await establishment of satisfactory escape management plans and equipment.

Distress beacons were desirable and some prototypes of limited range are available overseas; the application of radio-based tracking transducers should encompass this requirement. Protocols were not required.

Vital signs transducers exist in the medical/surveillance industries and could readily be deployed underground, given robust networks.
It was observed that the underground metalliferous industry was more advanced in communications than was coal and that much could be learned from this experience.
7. GAS MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES  
Gas Information for Effective and Safe Incident Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Availability of critical information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Design criteria for monitoring systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Location of monitoring points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Integrity of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Data management (software)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mines Rescue requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Underground personal gas monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communication surface to FAB team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Environmental team to FAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Training/competency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Control room persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Monitoring system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Refresher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6. Sampling

* Boreholes 47

### 7. Documentation

* Records 48

  * Management system 48

**Matrix 1**

  * Comparison of monitoring systems 49

**Matrix 2**

  * Location of monitoring points 50
7. GAS MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The Underground Mines Rescue Strategy Development group selected a gas management sub-committee to look at the gas management information required in an emergency and how it is to be provided. This request was related to the implementation of Task Group 4 recommendations 8,9 & 12 (see pp 10 - 12).

8. Fixed tube bundles and gas chromatographs should be made available at all mines as the primary method of measuring post incident mine atmospheric conditions. (Plans, R&D and legislation).

9. Research into the development of robust telemetric sensors for gas analysis and other environmental parameters, over the ranges existing after incidents, should be prioritised (R&D).

12. Rescue teams should be provided with state of the art environmental monitoring equipment and on-line communications (R&D).

The gas management sub-committee had the following membership:

P. Mckenzie-Wood (Chair), Mines Rescue Service, NSW
D. Kerr, Queensland Mines Rescue Brigade
R. Moreby, Dartbrook Coal
D. Cliff, Sintars
W. Allison, CFMEU, Queensland Branch
W. Price, Crinum Mine
G. Fawcett, Dept. Mineral Resources, NSW
7.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE:

1. To prepare guidance material that identifies available systems that will provide adequate information on gases for the effective and safe control of an incident.

2. To identify research and development requirements to enhance the adequacy of gas management systems in an emergency.
MOURA TASK GROUP 4
UNDERGROUND MINES RESCUE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT GROUP
GAS MANAGEMENT SUB-COMMITTEE

MEMBERS:  P. Mckenzie-Wood (Chair), MRS, NSW
D. Kerr, QMRB
R. Moreby, Dartbrook
D. Cliff, Simtars
W. Allison, CFMEU
W. Price, Crinum
G. Fawcett, Dept. Mineral Resources, NSW

OBJECTIVE:  To provide adequate information on gases during normal operations, during an incident and after an incident to enable effective and safe incident control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Element</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability of critical information.</td>
<td>Design criteria for monitoring systems.</td>
<td>• Comparison of systems - See Matrix 1 (page 49).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Redundancy of monitoring:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tubes and sensors in same location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Continuity of information:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Power backup (uninterrupted power supply - battery or generator);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Boreholes as additional sampling points;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Utilisation of exploratory boreholes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Robust (surface to underground) monitoring points to enhance the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>integrity of post incident information:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Fire resistant (self extinguishing);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Explosion resistant (protected, secured);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Boreholes may offer protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mobile monitoring systems (NUMBAT) to gain information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42 of 95
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Element</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>from additional locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Concentration ranges:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Avoid range switching at critical concentrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>eg 5% CH$_4$ and 15% CH$_4$;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- High range capability - dual systems such as tube bundle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and gas chromatograph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>eg 100% CH$_4$;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- High range methods and standards to be maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Gases:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- CO, CH$_4$, O$_2$, CO$_2$, and velocity - essential;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- H$_2$, C$_2$H$_4$ - capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Other information:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Transducer for velocity, temperature and differential pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>at appropriate locations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Accuracy, reliability:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Infrastructure to support calibration and maintenance to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>include documented procedures and Australian Standard,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>trained staff, range of calibration standards for all gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to cover all ranges;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Third party calibration audit, participation in post incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>correlation and cross-sensitivity exercises;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Consider pressure testing of tubes for leaks;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Consider cross-sensitivity of IR CO analyser to CO$_2$, N$_2$O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and H$_2$O, the CO electrochemical cell to H$_2$, H$_2$S, higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>hydrocarbons and the catalytic sensor to CO, H$_2$, low O$_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and poisons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> N$_2$O has been found in the goaf of a number of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>collieries and is thought to originate from adjacent open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cut operations and is a by-product from the use of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Response time:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Development in Safety and Area Rescue

**Arising from the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Element</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|             |        | - Results in real time required in ventilation splits, main returns and shaft bottom;  
|             |        | - Boreholes may improve tube bundle response.  
|             |        | Note: Lag time should be minimised at all locations.  
|             |        | - Research (improvement) requirements  
|             |        | - \( H_2 \) monitor (low and high range) and \( CO_2 \) sensors;  
|             |        | - Use of fibre optics for \( CH_4, CO, CO_2 \) (digital signal).  
|             |        | - Wind blast pressure technology;  
|             |        | - Intrinsically safe gas and ventilation monitors powered from the surface;  
|             |        | - Intrinsically safe chromatographs;  
|             |        | - Longer life sensors;  
|             |        | - Head-up display, sensors powered from caplamp.  
| Location of monitoring points. | All panel returns and bleeders.  
| | Intakes. |  
| | Belt roads (drive heads). |  
| | Active goaf edges. |  
| | Panel faces. |  
| | Seal areas (maintain adequate records). |  
| | Upcast shaft. |  
| | Surface monitoring room |  
| | See Matrix 2 for location requirements. |  
| | Research potential:  
| | - Investigate damage to tubes and sensors (in both borehole and roadway locations) in methane explosions.  
<p>| | Note: Klopperboss explosion gallery in South Africa has this capability |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Element</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                                  | Integrity of information.                                            | • Concentration (%, ppm), velocity, barometric and fan differential pressure:  
  - Recorded, trended graphically.  
• Sampling information:  
  - Frequency must ensure significant information is available for trending.  
• Air free:  
  - Computed, trended graphically.  
• Ratios and indicators of spontaneous combustion:  
  - Computed, trended graphically.  
• Explosibility:  
  - Concentration of CH₄, H₂, CO, O₂ and CO₂ need to be accurately determined;  
  - Computed, trended graphically.  
• Alarms:  
  - Discriminated, altered for incident levels, passworded.  
• Gas outlet for mobile laboratory.  
• Archive capability.  
• Alarm setting, calibration frequency records for audit. |
|                                  | Data management (software).                                           | • Ease of use (user friendly).  
• Tailoring to suit site needs.  
• Standard output interface for access by Incident Management Team.  
• Gas data to stand alone (in addition to instrument readout and not to be shared with other underground information).  
• Network capability / exportable / transmittable to underground locations.  
• Fully supported by supplier.  
• Availability of external expert assistance.  
• Remote access (modem / e-mail).  
• Remote viewing. |
| Interpretation. | • Availability of sufficient numbers of competent people:
- Experience;
- Qualification;
- Training. |
| Mines Rescue requirement. | **Underground personal gas monitoring.**
- Gases:
  - O₂, CO and total combustibles (CH₄ + H₂ + CO) on a 0-100% LEL output, CO₂, H₂S.
- 2 multigas instruments per team.
- Defeated or manipulated alarms and identifiable from normal mining instruments.
- Data logging and down loading capability.
- Protection from radio frequency interference.
- Other information:
  - Temperature;
  - Relative humidity. |
| Communication surface - FAB - team. | • Rely on in-mine communications (telephones, DAC, PED).
• Personal inductive radios.
• Multistrand aerial (carried and doubles as lifeline).
• Research requirement:
  - To make existing communication more robust, flexible, safe to use;
  - Fibre optic cable for digital radio transmission, video (helmet cam);
  - Reverse Ped to include transmission of gas and other environmental data. |
| Environmental team - FAB. | • Psychrometer (temperature and humidity).  
  • Anemometer (M³/sec).  
  • Velometer (M/sec).  
  • Research requirement:  
    - Intrinsically safe, direct read out of temperature, humidity,  
      velocity and quantity;  
    - I.R. thermography;  
    - Sonar;  

| Training / Competency. | Control room persons.  
  • Underground experience at least equivalent to that required to  
    obtain a current deputy certificate.  
  • Advanced first-aid / life support.  
  • Normal background levels, action trigger levels and action plans.  
  • Competency in modules from an accredited course dealing with:  
    - Emergency escape plans, location of caches;  
    - Emergency response plans;  
    - Principal management hazard plans;  
    - Familiarisation with underground operations;  
    - Mine gases / detection / monitoring / sampling;  
    - Principles of mine ventilation;  
    - Spontaneous combustion;  
    - Mine fires / explosions;  
    - Interpretation of associated gas mixtures;  
    - Communication skills.  

| Monitoring system. | • Sufficient competent people on site to operate, calibrate and  
  maintain system to ensure continuous relevant data is available  
  when required and in the format required.  

| Refresher. | • Industry standards.  
  • Challenge testing commensurate with frequency of exposure to  
    procedures and technology.  
  • Simulations to review adequacy of action plans.  

| Sampling. | Boreholes.  
  • Use of pre-installed boreholes.  
  • Emissions from rider seams.  
  • Effect of underground and surface pressure changes on inward /
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Documentation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Records</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| outwards breathing.  
• Effect of stratification of gases.  
• Difficulties with precise location of sample line end.  
• **Research requirements:**  
  - Better reliability of drilling location;  
  - Method to precisely determine the location of the end of the sample line. |
| • Archiving.  
• Average for discrete samples (eg skipping to every 5\textsuperscript{th} point?).  
• Training / competencies.  
• Calibration / maintenance.  
• Date of purchase / installation.  
• Duty cards / resource list (people, materials, support). |
| **Management system.** |  |
| • Procedures.  
• Roles and responsibilities.  
• Audits.  
• Review / upgrade to best practice. |
### MATRIX 1 - COMPARISON OF MONITORING SYSTEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Tube Bundle System</th>
<th>Sensor System</th>
<th>Gas Chromatography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advantages.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No explosion proof instruments required.</td>
<td>• Results in real time.</td>
<td>• Complete analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Easier maintenance.</td>
<td>• Long distances are possible with some types.</td>
<td>• No cross sensitivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No underground power requirements.</td>
<td>• Sensor failure is immediately recognised.</td>
<td>• Capable of measuring hydrogen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Wide range of gases.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Capable of measuring ethylene and higher hydrocarbons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Instruments can be calibrated on the surface.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Wide measuring range.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Readily attach additional instruments, mobile laboratory or gas chromatograph.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disadvantages.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Results not in real time.</td>
<td>• High maintenance.</td>
<td>• Relatively slow speed of analysis with some systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Leaks are not immediately apparent.</td>
<td>• Limited carbon monoxide sensor range (0.2%).</td>
<td>• High maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Condensation in tubes.</td>
<td>• Limited sensors (limited for carbon dioxide / none for hydrogen).</td>
<td>• Complex controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Faults not immediately apparent.</td>
<td>• Poisoning of methane sensor.</td>
<td>• Requires expert attention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tubes may be damaged in an explosion.</td>
<td>• In situ calibration.</td>
<td>• Regular calibration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cross sensitivity of CO IR cell.</td>
<td>• Cross sensitivity of CO sensor.</td>
<td>• High CH₄ concentrations may interfere with low level CO measurements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Loss of power (eg &gt; 1.25% methane).</td>
<td>• Requires discrete samples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Sec</td>
<td>CH₄%</td>
<td>CO₂%</td>
<td>COppm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel faces</td>
<td>Sensor only</td>
<td>Sensor only</td>
<td>Sensor only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active goaf edges</td>
<td>Sensor only</td>
<td>Tube only</td>
<td>Tube only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealed areas</td>
<td>Tube only</td>
<td>Tube only</td>
<td>Tube only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt roads</td>
<td>Sensor only</td>
<td>Sensor (Drive Head)</td>
<td>Sensor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive Head</td>
<td>Sensor only</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intakes</td>
<td>Sensor only</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel returns</td>
<td>Sensor only</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/C Shaft</td>
<td>Sensor only</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface monitoring Room</td>
<td>Tube</td>
<td>Tube</td>
<td>Tube</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓ - Tube and sensor required
8. AIDED RESCUE

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The issues relevant to Aided Rescue from underground mines have been examined to look at the equipment, systems, training and research projects that need to be considered. Recommendations and guidelines have been formulated with reference to Task Group 4 recommendations 1, 10, 11,12,13,18,19,20. The Aided Rescue sub-committee included:

A. Sellars (Chair), Queensland Mines Rescue
M. Downs, BHP Coal
C. Mallett, CSIRO
J. Tapp, CFMEU NSW
B. Lyne, DME Qld

8.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. To Prepare guidance material that identifies available systems and their limitations so that adequate provision may be considered in the design of mines or the development of a mines Hazard Management Plan.

2. To identify research and development requirements on refuge chambers, microseismic detection systems, large diameter drilling and rescue emergency vehicles.

8.3 REFUGE CHAMBERS USED IN UNDERGROUND MINING

8.3.1 General Background

The use of refuge chambers as a critical part of an underground rescue strategy is a recent development arising in conjunction with self contained (oxygen) self rescuers, blast resistant ventilation systems, emergency re-entry vehicles and techniques for inertisation of the mine atmosphere.
The ability to use inertisation techniques as a method of stabilising mine atmospheres prior to re-entry by rescue teams is likely to rely on new developments in life sign indicators, together with monitoring systems and communications systems that have a high degree of blast resistance / redundancy.

The strategy of refuge chamber usage, placement and associated infrastructure is critically linked to all of the above mentioned factors.

The advent of ventilation systems that are likely to remain largely intact after an incident in another part of the mine and the benefits of limited escape distances under self contained breathing apparatus prompt the likelihood of unaided escape from parts of a mine not directly impacted by an explosion or other major incident.

A significant explosion occurring in a working section is highly likely to totally disrupt the local ventilation system and seriously injure or kill all crew members in that section. Possibly the most effective technique in safeguarding face crews is the development of machine mounted triggered barriers.

It is plausible that the logical use of refuge chambers is to provide for life support for larger numbers of personnel under conditions of entrapment. Such conditions may pertain following the disruption of all means of egress, allowing the underground workforce to be sustained pending alternative means of escape.

Consideration of the above scenarios is beneficial in assessing the purpose and location of a refuge chamber, together with the probable construction and facilities required.

8.3.2 **Key Points of Overall Strategy**

The use of refuge chambers is predicated on the basis that;

- emergency egress to the surface is either prevented or is relatively more dangerous

52 of 95
Development in Self Escape and Aided Rescue
Arising from the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry

- entry to the refuge chamber can be achieved in emergency conditions (self contained breathing apparatus and cache systems to suit realistic travelling distances, plus guidance systems to the refuge chamber)
- personnel can be sustained in the chamber pending rescue
- personnel recovery from the chamber can be effected in a timely manner, either by stabilising external mine conditions to suit self egress, or by specialist teams equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus and emergency vehicles (this requires the development of suitable techniques and protocols for both atmospheric stabilisation and rescue team re-entry)

Each of the strategic factors above prompts a set of overall conditions or requirements that must be in place for the refuge chamber principle to be effective.

The concept of the refuge chamber is unlikely to work in isolation.

8.3.2.1 Overseas Experience

(a) Republic of South Africa

The use of refuge chambers in the Republic of South Africa (RSA) is well established, with legislative requirements in place for refuge chambers. (The requirements relate to the fire resistance rating of the entry doors and internal seating.)

It is worthwhile noting that there is no legislative requirement in the RSA to include a borehole, even though 150-mm boreholes are usually utilised with the refuge chambers.

Similarly, refuge chambers are not required to be “explosion proof”, although it is reported that this may be a future requirement.
The use of refuge chambers is applied in both coal and metalliferous mines in the RSA, the South Africans also having "operational" experience in the use of such chambers, with personnel having been "in residence" for 24 hours.

It has been reported that a significant part of the refuge chamber strategy in the RSA is based on the possible problems in directly evacuating large numbers of personnel usual in South African mines. The aim is therefore to enable all personnel to get to a place of relative safety and await instructions for an orderly retreat. (Personal Communication)

Well developed management schemes are in place in the RSA, covering chamber inspections, placement of chambers relative to working faces, chamber facilities / provisions, associated infrastructure and training / practice schedules.

MSA in South Africa have 2 refuge chamber designs commercially available, the basic specifications being:

- 6 men – 36 hours duration
- 20 men – 32 hours duration

(Brochures for such refuge chambers are appended to this report.)

In coalmines in the RSA, refuge chambers are generally located within 1,000 m of the working face, and are constructed in specially driven "blind ends", - NOT located in redundant cut-throughs. (This obviously improving the likelihood of survival in an explosion.)

It is reported that a large diameter borehole (280-mm) has been used in the Transvaal to effect a rescue from a refuge chamber.
In order to improve the escape from face areas, the South Africans have also developed a localised breathing support system — MARS (Mobile Air Rescue Station), which has a duration of 14 hours.

(b) United States of America

There is only one refuge chamber reported in use in the USA, this being at Twenty Mile mine. This may well be primarily driven by the mine layout, which employs longwall blocks with 6-km retreat.

The use of steel-lined service boreholes, especially in shallow mining conditions, is viewed in the USA as possibly providing a lightning conductor that may ignite underground gas accumulations.

(c) Canada

Although no information is to hand of specific usage of underground refuge chambers, published papers are reported in areas of ‘utilising compressed air for breathing’, and ‘keeping people alive in refuge chambers’.

(d) France

The use of small refuge chambers in outbye areas of gateroads has been reported, with such chambers being of “light” construction and primarily holding spare self contained self rescuers and communications facilities.

8.3.3 System Requirements

There are two basic forms of rescue chamber, these being either a portable chamber, or a static chamber, built in and limited to, a particular site in the mine.
Portable chambers should be viewed as being either "demountable" – implying the ability to be moved, but only with some difficulty, and "portable" – implying the ready ability to relocate the unit, perhaps in keeping with an advancing working face.

Any reference to a "mobile" refuge chamber is considered to refer to a personnel vehicle equipped to afford enhanced protection and life support features compared to vehicle designs in use at present.

This concept is not considered as part of this report, as the common interpretation of a refuge chamber is that of a non (self) propelled facility.

However, it is noted that a vehicle that will enable rescue teams to have vehicular transport in adverse atmospheres is currently under development.

8.3.3.1 Portable Refuge Chambers

a) Portable

The portable refuge chamber (PRC) concept has been proposed for development, although to date there has been no significant activity in this area.

A "portable" design implies a smaller chamber that would likely advance with the working face. Due to weight and size limitations it would be unlikely to be explosion resistant to any significant extent.

The chamber would be sized to accommodate a face crew only and would not operate in conjunction with service boreholes. Therefore, all breathing support, water, food, etc would be incorporated into a "stand alone" design.

Communications to the chamber would be provided as an adjunct to the mine communication system, and as such, may be considered open to disruption in the event of an explosion.
Development in Self Escape and Aided Rescue
Arising from the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry

Escape from the chamber would be by one of the following means:

- By foot or by vehicle, with occupants essentially exiting the mine without assistance, probably under fresh air conditions
  (This implies a normalisation of the mine conditions after a short period and a resumption of usual mine transport systems.)

- By foot, with occupants being assisted by a rescue team, possibly in irrespirable atmospheres

- By vehicle, with occupants either transferring to a specialist personnel vehicle capable of operating in adverse atmospheres
  (This is a part of the strategy behind the development of the Emergency Rescue Vehicle. Note that the probable range limitation of the vehicle currently being developed will promote the need for the section crews to be able to make their way out of the mine to a main ventilation split or main lateral development, in order for the two-way trip to be feasible.)

- Remaining inside the chamber, with a specialist vehicle removing same to fresh air, probably requiring a vehicle capable of operating in irrespirable atmospheres
  (This alternative is considered to be currently almost impossible, due to the extremely high power demands that a vehicle would have to sustain in order to drive to the chamber site, and then drag/tow the chamber to fresh air.)

It is difficult to envisage the scenario under which a portable refuge chamber would be of benefit, unless it was of explosion resistant construction.

A localised explosion in the face area would likely disrupt the inbye ventilation system and is likely to kill or seriously injure the personnel in the area. The crewmembers are likely to suffer conditions of extremely poor visibility, choking dust and noxious fumes
and certainly require the assistance of a guidance system and self contained self-rescuers.

It is also likely that a “lightweight” chamber would be seriously damaged in such an incident.

b) Demountable

A demountable chamber implies a facility that would be located in an outbye area of the working section, probably of reasonably robust construction, able to withstand small explosions, and linked to a surface borehole. This very much mirrors South African practice.

The chamber would probably be constructed along the lines of a heavy-duty container, and have on-board facilities and supplies with replenishment capabilities and communication via the borehole.

The use of an outbye chamber reflects a situation in which egress from the mine is prevented, either by a major disruption to the outbye area or by a major incident in an associated working district.

The usage is therefore characterised by the need for a temporary safe haven, probably required to house in excess of a face crew for a matter of days.

The chamber would need to provide air supplies and have an air-lock entry to enable the mine atmosphere to be inertised. This scenario would be critically dependent on life sign and communications systems.

8.3.3.2 Static Refuge Chambers

Static chambers are of myriad designs, each particular application being tailored to specific sites. Experience in South Africa indicates that chambers should be built in “blind ends”, ie not in redundant cut-throughs or between ventilation splits.
It is plausible to envisage a variety of construction methods being acceptable in the case of a static chamber, encompassing steel bulkheads, grout walls, block walls, etc. Such fixed chambers would be likely to be explosion resistant.

These chambers would be linked to the surface by a service borehole and may also be built in conjunction with an escape borehole or service shaft.

Due to their more central location, such static refuge chambers would need to facilitate greater numbers of personnel, in many respects being an enhanced facility for personnel delayed in evacuating the mine via normal / established emergency systems. Static chambers may therefore resemble a highly serviced assembly point.

8.3.3.3 Associated System Requirements

Significant training will be needed to gain behavioural acceptance of the refuge chamber as a “muster point” in case of an emergency, rather than “bolting for the surface”.

Guidance systems such as cone / lanyard ropes and audio visual systems are required to enable the refuge chamber to be reached under conditions of extremely poor visibility, disorientation, confusion and shock.

Chamber location guidance will be a key feature, to promote the ease of access to personnel with limited travelling capabilities due to capacity limitations with self-contained breathing apparatus.

Refuge chambers will need to be capable of affording protection against explosions, fires and inertisation, both to withstand an initial incident to be available to survivors and to protect the “inmates” against subsequent events.

The design parameters for refuge chambers therefore need to address;
Development in Self Escape and Aided Rescue
Arising from the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry

- supply of fresh air
- air-lock arrangements
- water and food supplies
- communications
- fire and explosion protection
- lighting
- retrieval of personnel

An inspection regime for the overall system will be required to maintain all facilities in effective working condition.

Recovery strategies for personnel in a refuge chamber will be required and needs to address the possibility of atmospheric stabilisation by inertisation prior to mine re-entry by rescue teams.

8.3.4 Industry Developments – Australia

In Australia, a portable chamber design is marketed by MSA, whilst information from the RSA indicates the development of a relatively sophisticated portable design is reasonably advanced. There are instances of refuge chambers in use in Australia, the most notable being the Capcoal Central example. This chamber is a static chamber, built in a reasonably central proximity to a number of working areas and featuring a large diameter borehole (mini vent shaft) in close proximity for emergency egress.

The use of personal self-contained breathing apparatus has recently become an imminent requirement in Queensland, and this together with a ‘cache’ system to provide greater duration, better facilitates the arrival at a chamber.

Various guidance systems for use in conditions of poor visibility are available, and are being actively promoted for immediate usage in underground coal mines.
A research submission is currently being considered that if successful in being funded will ultimately deliver a rescue vehicle.

Further work is also planned in the area of inertisation, which with the recent purchase of the GAG 3 equipment provides a strong inertisation capability for Australian mines.

The adoption of standards applicable to all structural ventilation devices in underground coal mines in Queensland will enhance the possibility of personnel survival in the event of an explosion, such that the provision of post-explosion facilities may become more relevant.

It should be recognised that the adoption of refuge chambers and associated strategies is as an alternative to "escape-ways", but that the refuge chamber may also have some benefit in the instance of a major mine fire.

References: Overseas Study Tour of South Africa, France, Germany & USA to Investigate Self Contained Self-Rescuers and Underground Escape Strategies

R Bancroft – Senior Inspector of Mines (Coal) 23rd June 1997

Support Material: Dräger & MSA Product pamphlets for rescue equipment, including Refuge Chambers.

A research submission is currently being considered that if successful in being funded will ultimately deliver a rescue vehicle. Further work is also planned in the area of inertisation, which with the recent purchase of the GAG 3 equipment provides a strong inertisation capability for Australian mines.

An associated development in the Australian industry that is most pertinent to the overall safety of underground coal mines in the adoption of standards applicable to all structural ventilation devices. These standards and the resultant improved structures will enhance the possibility of personnel survival in the event of an explosion, such that the provision of post explosion facilities may become more relevant.
It should be recognised that the adoption of refuge chambers and associated strategies is as an alternative to "escapeways" but that the refuge chamber may also have some benefit in the instance of a major mine fire.

8.4 MICROSEISMIC DETECTION SYSTEMS

8.4.1 Introduction

In the US, MSHA maintains a microseismic monitoring facility which can be deployed on the surface, and can locate signals generated by miners striking the roof and floor of the mine. There is also a portable system which could be taken into emergency zones to help locate people or significant events. These form part of the emergency response facilities of MSHA. The MSHA surface system is described and the potential for application of microseismic emergency monitoring in Australia is discussed.

8.4.2 The MSHA Seismic Location System

A seismic location system was developed by the USBM in the early 1980s to locate workers trapped underground. A truck with geophysical monitoring equipment was assembled, and a standardised routine for trapped workers devised. The deployment procedures and elements in the system are:

1. A truck with geophone arrays and recording equipment is deployed on the surface above a mine where workers are trapped. Up to seven arrays are used and the geophones located with GPS.

2. Trapped workers are notified that the monitoring system is in place by firing three explosive charges.
3. Signals are then generated by trapped workers striking the roof and floor of the mine 10 times in succession. If no response is received from the surface, the 10 blows are to be repeated every 15 minutes.

4. When a signal from the miners is received at the surface, and the source located, 5 shots are fired to indicated to the underground workers that their signals have been received and that they are located.

Experimental systems were reported by Shope et al 1982 and it was claimed the system was effective to 600m. An operational unit is maintained in a state of readiness by the Mine Safety and Health Administration at Pittsburgh Research Centre, Brucetown and its operation. It is reported that the current system can detect signals at a range of 450m and can locate the signal source to within 30m. The unit is tested in field trials 3 times a year.

Miners are issued with a hat sticker by MSHA, which describes the procedures to follow if they find themselves trapped underground.

Although the MSHA system is directed to the precise location of trapped workers underground, it also performs an extremely important function of confirming that trapped workers are alive. This is of great value to the rescue operation even if their precise locality cannot be determined.

8.4.3 Microseismic Application for Australia

8.4.3.1 Surface systems

The MSHA equipment is entirely surface based. The technique detects the characteristic signal made by the miner’s blows in the mine, and locates the signal source by triangulation of the wave paths detected by arrays on the surface. This utilises source location routines commonly used in seismology. Arrays of geophones are used to reduce extraneous surface seismic sources, so the signal initiated by the
underground miners is enhanced. A surface system does not require any prior development of infrastructure by the mine site.

**Requirements for an effective surface system include:**

Access to the surface.

This can be restricted by rugged terrain, cultural developments or overlying water bodies.

**Propagation of signals**

An essential requirement for an effective surface system is that the underground signals must propagate to the surface. The American experience indicates that signals can be detected up to 450m in some strata conditions. Strata may attenuate or divert signals so they cannot reach the surface. Microseismic experiments in Australian mines have encountered difficulties monitoring signals from depth, and causal factors include:

- source too deep;
- strata structurally disrupted;
- layered high and low velocity beds;
- rapid signal attenuation in goaf and gassy units;
- overlying Tertiary and Quaternary sediments and volcanics.

From the Australian experience 450m detection distances is expected to represent the best possible performance, and this would only be in the most favourable circumstances. Areas with thick Tertiary and Quaternary sediments at the surface would prevent any surface detection of signals from working depths.

Potential conditions affecting signal detection in Australia coalfields include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negatives</th>
<th>Positives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Development in Self Escape and Aided Rescue

*Arising from the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Surface Characteristics</th>
<th>Access Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern coalfield</td>
<td>Mines generally too deep, Surface access</td>
<td>Solid rock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Coalfield</td>
<td>Surface access</td>
<td>Solid rock, Some shallower workings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Surface access, Strong &amp; weak layers</td>
<td>Some shallower workings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter valley</td>
<td>Localised surficial deposits</td>
<td>Access generally good, Shallower workings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowen Basin</td>
<td>Extensive surficial deposits</td>
<td>Shallow workings, Access generally good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An analysis on a mine by mine basis would show that some locations potentially have excellent conditions for surface detection, and others are unlikely to be successful sites at the depths of current mining.

**Deployable systems**

A surface microseismic system would have to be maintained at the ready if it was to be used in emergencies. There would have to be a standing capacity and emergency access to trained operators. This would logically be a shared industry facility rather than the responsibility of any operator. The microseismic techniques and equipment required are well known and a number of Australian consultants and agencies could provide the technical requirements.

8.4.3.2 Borehole systems

Some of the difficulties with surface systems in Australia could be overcome by using geophones installed in boreholes. These can be placed in competent rock near to the
worked seams, to reduce propagation distances and to avoid wave paths travelling through problem materials.

Many exploration boreholes are drilled around underground developments, and it would be simple and inexpensive to install a geophone during grouting of the holes. These geophones could be used during emergencies.

The position of boreholes is based on other specific needs so it is unlikely that a mine would be able to set up a network which would allow triangulation coverage of all underground areas. Most mines however, would get a coverage of boreholes which would provide at least one monitoring point throughout the workings. This would at least allow confirmation that trapped workers were alive, and indicate that their location was within the detection area of the activated geophone. If triangulation and location detection were not required, each borehole would need only a basic monitoring device to record the geophone signals, so that any repeated seismic waves generated by the miners could be identified. These units could be deployed along with other mine rescue service activities, and would not require specialised personnel.

8.4.3.3 Small portable microseismic systems

Small portable microseismic systems can be transported and operated in any emergency situation. MSHA has such a unit which has also been used at natural disasters such as earthquakes. These units use well known technology and commercial groups could either provide equipment or a service.

8.4.3.4 Introducing the Technology in Australia

The lack of any local experience discourages the implementation of microseismic technology for rescue operations in Australia. This could be overcome by undertaking demonstrations of surface and borehole configurations by using existing geophone installations and conventional seismic survey instrumentation.
Success in these trials could lead on to the provision of seismic personal location service for emergencies, which could include the following elements:

- adoption of routine geophone installation in boreholes;
- establishing local mine performance;
- training of workers to use the system;
- training and equipping of mines rescue services;

8.4.4 Summary

Microseismic location from the surface, of underground miners hammering, is demonstrated by MSHA in the US, for distances up to 450m at 30m accuracy.

Only a small proportion of Australian mines are believed to be amenable to surface detection methods because of unfavourable access problems or geological conditions.

Mines with favourable conditions could do local tests, and there are a number of Australian groups with the technical capability to advise mines.

Geophones installed in mine boreholes could provide a good coverage of most mines and provide a way to verify miners were still alive, and their general location. A simple instrument would need to be developed to monitor the geophones, and could be deployed by mine staff or mines rescue brigades.

Widespread take up by the Australian mining industry is dependent on successful demonstration of the technique.

8.5 LARGE DIAMETER DRILLING

8.5.1 Existing knowledge

To date boreholes for escape for rescue are in use in only one (1) mine in Australia at Central Colliery Queensland. Many mines do however have shafts and raises which may be adaptable for recovery.
The present maximum technology available in Australia would allow for 12" (300mm) reamed holes to be drilled without much difficulty.

The largest hammer drill rig in Australia (open hole 24" 610mm) is expensive and not often available, the main disadvantages to large diameter bore holes is compressor capacity as large diameter drill units require 6-7 compressors operating.

A 600mm x 250 meter deep hole would take approximately 2 weeks to drill and cost $200,000 drilling from the surface.

The CAPCOAL Rescue Borehole System conservatively cost $800,000 for a 2.1 meter shaft, which is partially lined to 1.8 meters at additional cost taking another 9 weeks, actual hole drilling was 4 weeks by raised bore methods.

8.5.2 Overseas

8.5.2.1 South Africa

South Africa Rescue utilises an Ingersol Rand Drill Rig imported from the USA. This unit replacement cost including recovery capsule is estimated at $3-5 million.

The unit is air flushed and will drill to 300 meters at a drilling rate of 10m to 2m per hour depending on strata, hole diameter is 640mm. Compressed air requirements are supplied by a 5000 CFM compressor. No protection for gas mixing is presently utilised.

8.5.2.2 USA

The United States through MSHA - Utilise private companies to do similar work as the South Africans.

The most suitable rig is the I.R.R.D. 20 at a cost of $2-3 million including drill rod and miscellaneous equipment. At present there is a practicable depth limitation of around 300 meters for such equipment.

Further information may be sourced from: South Africa, United States and Canada

Evaluation

Evaluation of boreholes is covered in the following studies:

1. Comparison of Shafts and Boreholes both existing and drilled

2. Rating of Shaft Borehole Escape Systems

3. Cost/Benefit Analysis of Boreholes for Rescue and Recovery
8.5.3 Summary

- Mine exploration boreholes should be considered for future application in monitoring and rescue recovery.

- Pre planned large boreholes or shaft recovery systems may be considered for mines at depth or under difficult terrain. Such systems are very expensive and of the order of one ($1M) million dollars or higher.

- If long term refuge bays are considered then rescue bore holes should form part of the system.

- In situations where fires of explosions are involved, the drilling of boreholes may increase the risk of secondary ignitions particularly large diameter boreholes.

- The cost of large diameter borehole is very expensive $300,000 - $500,000 each. The cost of the recovery and drilling equipment is between $3-$5 million dollars.

- This system is presently limited to 300m depth and its application is restricted to certain coal mining areas in NSW, but would be capable of reaching most of Queensland's underground coal mine workings, so far as depth is concerned.

8.5.4 Recommendations

8.5.4.1 Large Boreholes for Personnel Recovery

These recommendations are aimed at assisting and allowing personnel to be rescued in the event of a major incident in an underground mine where assistance is required and self rescue not possible.

a) Mine Management should have a rescue management system to consider the need for borehole or shaft recovery from the mine in conjunction with other rescue strategies.

b) While cost should not have a place in saving lives it must be considered in its relative value to other systems. The cost of the complete recovery system to be held available in Australia would be in the order of $3 - $5 million plus ongoing maintenance.

c) Preliminary studies indicates the Large Diameter Emergency Drill may have applications as follows:-

Depth limitations < 300m and topography (mountains, lakes etc.)

NSW - 16 out of 36 mines only, mostly in the north
QLD -16 mines (virtually all Queensland mines)
STRATA -May be further restrictions with unconsolidated ground
GAS and WATER INGRESS -May be a further complication

In summary borehole drilling and recovery is not available to all mines but may have application for 30% of NSW mines and in excess of 80% of Queensland mines.

d) It is recommended that personnel be sent to South Africa, America and Canada to evaluate large diameter borehole drilling and recovery systems for use in Australian Coal Mines.

e) It is suggested that mobile capsule recovery systems be developed for mines. Such emergency recovery will be maintained in a central location in a state of readiness.

f) It is recommended that ongoing research continue to evaluate current and future technology for blind hole drilling of large diameter boreholes for personnel recovery whilst minimising risk in hazardous atmospheres (secondary explosions).

g) A review of options for use of a standby system utilising a large diameter drill rig may be possible with Australian drilling contractors on a fee basis with emergency use provisions.

h) The option of flying in equipment from South Africa or USA is possible. This has been discussed with South African operators. The availability of suitable air transport would require development and planning.

i) An Emergency Recovery System would appear to be essential for recovery from shaft mines after an incident.

j) Long term refuge chambers may require boreholes to be linked to the chamber for personnel recovery in an emergency or an alternative emergency recovery system.

k) When borehole recovery or large diameter borehole drilling is an acceptable recovery strategy for mines, the following requirements should be considered:

- Recovery of personnel from boreholes
- Entry of rescue teams down boreholes for recovery
- Life support programs for personnel entry and exit
- Drilling protocols and assessed strata requirements
- Holing into hazardous environments

8.5.4.2 Small Boreholes

Life support environmental Information and investigation
a) Mine Management should have a complete rescue management plan to utilise the existing exploration boreholes for data and emergency rescue capabilities.

b) Mine Management should establish a short list of available drillers and drilling equipment who should be readily available in an emergency to drill boreholes of suitable size to accommodate the following:-

- Environmental monitoring
- Borehole sonde application (video and gas monitoring requirements)
- Supply of air/water/food and monitoring, as required by the emergency plan of operations and recovery

c) It is suggested that boreholes be utilised where possible for nodal data, communications and monitoring to maintain maximum mine integrity after a serious incident such as an explosion or ignition.

d) Exploration boreholes should be reviewed by Mine Management under an established procedure to evaluate their future use and suitability prior to decommissioning.

e) The availability of small diameter drill rigs is high, consequently there is no need to maintain such a system in readiness. Mines should however maintain a list of readily available drillers and drills who could be activated in an emergency unless such an activity is precluded due to special limitations (mining under water etc.)

f) The development and maintenance of equipment to be held in readiness for an emergency by Rescue Services should include:-

- Borehole sonde - video, environmental monitoring etc...
- Borehole gas analysis sampling
- Borehole sealing system to comply with the above systems
- Mobile laboratory for onsite and monitoring or remote sampling areas including gas chromatography
- The requirements and availability of large diameter drilling equipment for use in an emergency.

g) Protocols must be established for hazardous borehole operations to meet the above criteria as decided at minesites by management, and rescue organisations.

8.5.5 Enclosed Borehole Information Tables

(1) Risk Rating for Borehole Escape Systems

(2) Cost Analysis of Boreholes for Rescue and Escape
(3) Use/Benefit of Boreholes for Rescue Recovery

(4) NSW - Borehole Evaluation for Escape and Rescue

(5) South African Big Drill/Recovery

(6) Borehole Sonde System
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISKS (5-0)</th>
<th>EXISTING SHAFTS</th>
<th>ESTABLISH RECOVERY SHAFT</th>
<th>DRILL RECOVERY SH/BH</th>
<th>SERVICE EXISTING BH</th>
<th>DRILL SERVICE BH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alters vent</td>
<td>1 (low)</td>
<td>2 (medium)</td>
<td>3 (high)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (low) unless damaged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May be source of secondary explosion</td>
<td>1 (low)</td>
<td>2 (medium)</td>
<td>3 (high)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(air ingress)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignition source (hot bit/sparks)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (low)</td>
<td>2 (medium)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss target</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical risk to entrapped</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water gas ingress</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hole collapse</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) - RATINGS OF SHAFT BOREHOLE ESCAPE SYSTEMS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PEOPLE RECOVERY</strong></th>
<th><strong>ASSISTANCE INFORMATION</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TYPE</strong></td>
<td><strong>EXISTING RECOVERY SH/BH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADVANTAGES</strong></td>
<td>- Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Already established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Services/power/water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Easy access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- High rescue/recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Recovery Equip. on site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VENTILATION MINE ENVIRONMENT</strong></td>
<td>- May significantly effect design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DISADVANTAGES</strong></td>
<td>- Effect on ventilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Poor location for recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Time Delay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unlined - possible gas/water ingress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Possible wall collapse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Blockage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Initially its use is limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RISKS</strong></td>
<td>- Possible air lock damage due to explosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COST BENEFIT</strong></td>
<td>- Cheapest as it exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESOURCING MODIFICATION</strong></td>
<td>- High capital outlay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ongoing maint. at each mine recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) - COST ANALYSIS OF BOREHOLES FOR RESCUE/RECOVERY
## (3) USE/BENEFIT OF BOREHOLE FOR RESCUE RECOVERY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COST</th>
<th>INFORMATION</th>
<th>SERVICES</th>
<th>LIFE SUPPORT</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nil</td>
<td>existing boreholes/information - 100 to 150mm diam/HQ-BQ rods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| $25/m open | drill special boreholes for information - 100 to 150mm | | | *
| $100/m core | reqd - b.hole camera/lights monitors - not presently available | | | |
| $80-100/m open | drill boreholes at spec'd location for info/food/air/water - 200 to 300mm | | | *
| | reqd - services module - not presently available | | | |
| $45/m (150mm) | 150mm pilot, 250mm ream, max 375mm | | | |
| $150/m (250mm) | (available on reasonably short notice) | | | |
| $200,000- $800,000 ea | existing pre-drilled (650mm min reqd for man escape) | | | *
| | recommend 1000mm hole (if lined, can be reduced) | | | |
| | reqd - rescue capsule/winder/inert gas/lights etc - not presently available | | | *
| $5 m | drill 650mm to 1000mm for rescue recovery | | | *
| $2-3 m | reqd - drill rig and recovery unit not presently available | | | |
| | South African unit - rate 2-10 m/hr at 650mm to 300m depth | | | |
| | USA - (IR RD20) rig will drill 1000mm to 300m depth | | | |
(4) NSW – BOREHOLE EVALUATION FOR ESCAPE AND RESCUE

Boreholes for Person Escape

Where borehole escape is an element of an emergency escape system all necessary drilling and escape equipment should be provided on standby or the borehole should be pre-drilled.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-element</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positioning</td>
<td>Surface site features</td>
<td>The site should have all weather access, be level, clear of vegetation, services and any other obstacle to drilling. The area required is about 100m x 100m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The ground under and around where drilling rig is to be erected must be consolidated and capable of supporting the rig. It should be free draining and above flood level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hole location/s should be surveyed and marked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strata details / drillability</td>
<td>A geological section showing strata types and thicknesses from surface to underground should be prepared. Also advice as to whether the hole is likely to contain an aquifer or gas and on drillability and strata stability. Estimate of drill time to reach target should be provided.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Underground roof conditions could be described, bed separation above workings should be established and documented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target site</td>
<td>In South Africa (SA) coal mines the aim is to drill an escape hole to intersect the working just outside a refuge chamber.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### (4) NSW – BOREHOLE EVALUATION FOR ESCAPE AND RESCUE (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rig availability</th>
<th>Overseas experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa – On the recommendation of Ingersol Rand (US) the S.A. Chamber of Mines in 1977 purchased a DHD – 124 downhole drill on T-5 Drillmaster mounting for use in drilling escape holes into coal mines. The main power pack is a Soiro-Flo DXL – 5000S mobile compressor capable of delivering $2.4 m^3/sec$ of air at 850 kPa. This unit together with trailers loaded with drill rods and casing, rescue and workshop equipment and plant and a mobile crane, are garaged and maintained at the Witbank Training College S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States – No unit is currently maintained on standby for mine rescue. Recent advice from the U.S. is that if the need arose there would be sufficient rigs available in U.S. industry to cover the need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Australia – No unit is currently maintained on standby for mine rescue. A contractor would have to provide a suitable rig on call. Rigs that would have the capacity to handle the downhole equipment as used in S.A. are scarce and would most likely require modification. Specialist ancillary equipment would have to be purchased and maintained.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mobilisation costs | The very high capital and maintenance costs incurred in having a drilling system on permanent standby for S.A. coal mines is being paid for by means of a levy on all underground coal mines. |
|--------------------| The working depths and surface terrain of many NSW mines make the drilling of borehole escapeways often impractical and the NSW and Qld coal industries are unlikely to support the establishment of an industry owned and maintained unit. |
### Planning

Any mine manager who may need to drill an emergency borehole suitable for person escape, should plan ahead to:

- locate and contact a drilling company with suitable hole making capabilities;
- establish inventory needs for all escape equipment and contractor consumables;
- locate all necessary escape equipment;
- select potential drill sites and document geological details;
- survey sites; and
- prepare an emergency response management plan.

### Hole specification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diameter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum diameter hole drilled for escape in S.A. mines is 560mm. They plan for a 635mm hole to be routinely drilled. If for some reason the hole has to be cased, this can be achieved and still allow for continuation of the hole at 560mm. Adequate tolerance is required to avoid locking of the rescue capsule. In S.A. a 430m outside diameter rescue capsule is used to raise trapped men.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Depth limitation

The maximum depth of hole will be limited by the power of the rig to handle and lift the drill rods and down hole equipment. With the rig / drill string / Down Hole Drill (DHD) Hammer set-up as described in this document for S.A., this is about 270m. Ability to flush cuttings from the hole may also be a limiting factor.

### Drilling operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drilling options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• blind boring with DHD hammer;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• blind boring with conventional rotary rig drilling full diameter;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• blind boring with conventional drilling with core recovery;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• conventional drilling of a pilot hole then milling / reaming.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One pass drilling is normally quicker.
Drilling Operation cont.  Penetration rates  Air powered DHD Hammer has the fastest penetration rate and is the preferred method and the method adopted in S.A.

- a conventional rotary rig using mud as the drilling fluid is estimated to take 4-5 times as long to drill the same diameter hole as a DHD Hammer.

- The T-5 Drillmaster / DHD - 124 unit is S.A. is capable of drilling 9-10 m/hr in coal measures (UCS 48 - 100 MPa) and 3-4 m/hr in Dolerite (UCS 250 - 390 MPa).

- Set-up time on arrival at a pre-prepared site for this rig is about 1.5 - 2.5 hours.

Clearing cuttings  With blind boring cuttings are removed to the surface principally by air, foam or mud.

- Up hole velocity is a critical factor in removing the cuttings. Where air flushing is used, large diameter (duel pipe) drill rods serve to reduce the annulus area to achieve the required air velocity. These are heavy and require a suitable modified drill rig with high lifting power to accommodate them. 508 mm diameter drill rods are used in S.A.

- One NSW drilling contractor suggests that sufficient air can be supplied by three compressors operating in tandem, providing a total of 2,700 cfm (1.275 m³/sec) at 350 psi (2.45 MPa), to lift cuttings up the hole annulus when using a 7 5/8 inch (220 mm) drill rods.

- Alternatively cuttings can be removed by flushing down a pre-sunk pilot hole. The potential for the cuttings to cause problems either in blockage or in the underground working would have to be assessed.
(4) NSW – BOREHOLE EVALUATION FOR ESCAPE AND RESCUE (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drilling Operations cont.</th>
<th>Hole stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suitable diameter casing needs to be available for installation in unstable overburden at the top section of the hole. Where hole stability problems may be encountered at depth, intermediate casing may be required. Rapid setting cements may have to be employed to stabilise intermediate casing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Danger of introducing explosive gas or holing into explosive gas. | Consideration should be given to the potential for ignition on holing the workings. Inflammable gas may be intersected in the borehole strata and flushed into the working on holing or an explosive atmosphere may have built up in the workings prior to holing preventative measures should be adopted to avoid an explosion. |

| Surveillance probe | Maintenance of a post surveillance probe fitted with video camera and audio communication system and capable of being lowered down a 150mm diameter borehole, should be considered for reconnaissance purposes. |
(5) SOUTH AFRICAN BIG DRILL/RECOVERY

Photo 1-South African Drill Rig and Drill Rig Trailer

Photo 2-South African 5,000 CFM Air Compressor for Large Diameter Drill Rig
Development in Self Escape and Aided Rescue
Arising from the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry

Photo 3-Borehole Main Recovery Capsule (TORPEDO) for Large Diameter Drill Rig

Photo 4-Support Trailer for Large Diameter Drill Rig & Borehole Sonde Recovery
(5)

PARTICULARS OF THE RESCUE DRILLING UNIT

EMERGENCY VEHICLES

(a) INGERSOLL RAND DRILL RIG (T5)

Vehicle Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length (mm)</th>
<th>Width (mm)</th>
<th>Height (mm)</th>
<th>Wheelbase (mm)</th>
<th>Overhang Front (mm)</th>
<th>Overhang Rear (mm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12960</td>
<td>3340</td>
<td>4420</td>
<td>4250</td>
<td>3680</td>
<td>3430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Axle mass

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Front (kg)</th>
<th>Rear (kg)</th>
<th>Total (kg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8320</td>
<td>9475</td>
<td>18945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gross vehicle mass - 36749 kg
1. **ROD TRAILER** (Three (3) off)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trailer dimensions</th>
<th>Length (mm)</th>
<th>Width (mm)</th>
<th>Height (mm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11700</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>3500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gross vehicle mass - 29564kg

(c) **INGERSOLL RAND MOBILE COMPRESSOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compressor dimensions</th>
<th>Length (mm)</th>
<th>Width (mm)</th>
<th>Height (mm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12200</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>4300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gross vehicle mass - 33500kg
(6) BOREHOLE SONDE SYSTEM

Photo 1 - Borehole Sonde Jib and Caravan (Sonde Camera and Lights etc. held)
8.6  RESCUE EMERGENCY VEHICLE

8.6.1 Existing Knowledge

At present time the most advanced vehicle for mine emergency use world wide appears to be the SCIRO developed NUMBAT.

Other countries have worked on similar prototypes especially in the USA, Japan and South Africa, all of these developments presently fall short of the NUMBAT.

The NUMBAT is a small robust unmanned monitoring vehicle for exploratory work in hazardous environments.

NUMBAT has limitations when considering rescue and recovery operations. Some of its restrictions are its size, speed, ground clearance and travel capabilities. It should be noted that the vehicle as a monitoring tool has some significant advantages, which are lost when rescue and recovery are considered.

The loss is associated with the size of a rescue/recovery vehicle, consequently the NUMBAT and REV systems complement the total Aided Rescue Strategy.

8.6.2 Feasibility of the Rescue Emergency Vehicle

The development of a mines rescue recovery vehicle was under consideration prior to the Moura incident due to the need for rapid rescue and recovery procedures of mines to quickly minimise risk and exposure of rescue teams and maximise personnel recovery from mine incidents.

Feasibility studies were evaluated to determine the most appropriate vehicle configuration.

This unit is proposed to be designed to operate in irrespirable and hazardous atmospheres;

i) to carry rescue teams;
ii) to recover miners;
iii) to carry equipment;
iv) to monitor and report data.

Once mine controls are in place after or during an incident a rescue emergency vehicle may be detached for personnel or mine recovery subject to procedures and protocols.

This vehicle has been developed from such a base:

- originally it was to be battery powered, however, weight of the machine, speed and grade affects on the vehicles capability have altered this view.
- the present proposed vehicle is based upon the U.P.V. design which is in operation and diesel powered.
- originally the vehicle was to be rubber tyred for simplicity, the vehicle is now track mounted for speed, comfort of travel and maneuverability.
8.6.3 Development of the Rescue Vehicle

From the feasibility work conducted by Sub Group 4 and supporting engineering expertise, vehicle development is proposed in 1998 to Stage 1. This development programme will consist of two (2) Stages.

8.6.3.1 Stage 1

Funding the support development has been sourced from ACARP, ANI and other sponsors to assist in developing this unique and technically advanced vehicle.

Figure 1 – Proposed Emergency Rescue Vehicle
8.6.4 REV Engine and Fuel System

The power unit for this vehicle is proposed as an enclosed cryogenic loop supplying a diesel engine with atmospheric monitoring controls and engine temperature controls for operating hazardous atmospheres.

- The power unit will be diesel based upon a dual fuel arrangement.
- Normal atmospheres — for training will be diesel fuel (conventional arrangement).
- Irrespirable or hazardous atmospheres will be by cryogenic fuels with an operational time of 3 to 4 hour’s duration. This system will assist in cabin cooling during vehicle operation.
A modular design of vehicle was required to this end the rear of this vehicle can be

i) a man pod;

ii) vehicle carry platform e.g. NUMBAT;

iii) materials vehicle.
Figure 4 - Proposed Emergency Rescue Vehicle (plan)
Development

This is proposed subject to satisfactory trials of Stage 1.

Stage 2 is planned to proceed in 1999.

Stage 2 – Addresses a number of safety and operational improvements:
- automated control;
- comprehensive monitoring systems;
- sealed explosion resistant man capsule;
- on board air supplies;
- compressed air capability;
- robotic arm attachment;
- fully computerised monitoring and data collection including mine plan and new ventilation data systems;
- infra red capacity.

8.6.3 Summary
The successful development of REV will place Australia mine emergency response capabilities in advance of any other country and provide the Mining Industry with the first integrated mine emergency recovery system which can effectively enter hazardous environments to recover personnel, trapped or injured and rapidly return them to the safety of the surface at minimal risk to all personnel involved.

REFERENCES


MSA PRODUCT, May 1997 Mines Refuge Chambers.

DRAGER PRODUCT, May 1996/97 Oxygen Self Rescuers and Fresh Air Base Refuge Chamber.
9. MINES RESCUE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

9.1 INTRODUCTION - INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

The Underground Mines Rescue Strategy Development group selected a committee to look at the information, equipment and other criteria needed in an emergency to manage an incident. The issues were related to the implementation of Task Group 4 recommendations 15, 16, 17.

15 Capability to model ventilation and the mine environment following an incident.
16 Integrated emergency preparedness guidelines for mine operators and emergency services, common to both Qld & NSW.
17 Development of computer-based emergency decision support system for incident management and training.

The incident management sub-committee included:

- G. Gibson MRSNSW (Chairman)
- W. English QDME (Secretary)
- B. Garland QMC/North Goonyella
- S. Gillies University of Qld
- F. Hendricks NSWMC/BHP Collieries
- A. Hutchings QMRB
- R. Stothard CFMEU

9.2 VENTILATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL MODELLING

Ventilation modelling to include:

- modelling of post incident mine ventilation and atmosphere to be a required element of Mine Safety Management Plans;
- development of learned ventilation and fire control responses for different incident scenarios and locations, pre determined for each mine, with plans prepared and personnel trained in appropriate action plans;
- determining the explosibility of atmospheres;
• distillation profiles for the coal in each mine to be determined and incorporated into models;
• models to interface with standard mine planning packages and kept up to date.

Progress report

• Survey of industry ventilation modelling
  • Of 18 mines using MINVENT 17 operated by consultants
  • Of 11 mines using VENTSIM only 2 use consultants
  • 5 other mines use 3 other modelling systems
  • 10 (smaller) mines currently do not model
  • No contact/responses from 9 mines

• VENTSIM
  • Windows based system designed and supported in Australia
  • User friendly, favoured by experienced mine ventilation engineers

• MINVENT
  • Currently favoured by consultants, perhaps because of better printing facilities
  • Limited support available

• Two post-incident ventilation/environmental monitoring systems identified
  • M-FIRE, developed by MSHA for simulation of mine fires
  • POZAR, developed by Polish Ventilation Academy to enable mines to simulate mine fire effects in multi-face/seam mines and evaluate intervention strategies

• M-FIRE
  • Public domain software, limited adoption and development, only validated once

• POZAR
  • Routinely adopted by Polish mines, intervention evaluations accepted by Polish authorities
  • Trialed at Collinsville, and to undergo further evaluation at North Goonyella

Current marketing strategy limits access
9

SELECTION MATRIX FOR INDUSTRY SYSTEM

9

• User friendly (Windows based);
• Capable of being broadly adopted as industry standard;
• Acceptable to new generation Ventilation Officer;
• Integrate with mine planning/survey systems;
• Capable of modelling dynamic situations;
• Capable of integrating real time P, Q, & T data.

9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS BEING CONSIDERED

• Support concept of statutory Ventilation Officer and development of appropriate competencies;
• Competencies to include ventilation modelling in static and dynamic post-incident applications;
• User friendly ventilation software should be adopted as industry standard;
• Develop capability to integrate real time P, Q, T;
• Develop integrated industry network and expert system for post-incident monitoring and evaluation.

9.5 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS GUIDELINES

• Guidelines should address:
  • Roles and responsibilities of mine management and emergency services in an emergency;
  • Consolidation and integration of emergency response procedures developed through principal hazard management plans;
  • Development of a common training program as a joint pre-requisite for mine managers and undermanagers accreditation in Qld and NSW;
  • Development, maintenance and assessment of appropriate competencies.

Progress report

• MRBNSW has developed Guidelines for mines rescue organisations and personnel, currently being evaluated by QMRS.
9.6 COMPUTER-BASED EMERGENCY DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM

- Incident Management enhanced by decision support system that:
  - provides strategic information on the mine and the incident;
  - provides an analysis of the developing situation;
  - presents prioritised options available;
  - provides training system.

Progress report
- ECAS system developed by ACIRL under NERDDC funding in 1989-90 requires significant enhancement and more user friendly platform;
- Literature search underway to identify other possible systems;
- Systems utilised by armed forces and emergency services to be investigated;
- CSIRO trial of Virtual Reality Modelling System including mine emergency applications supported.