On afternoon shift 14 March 1995 Anthony Wild (Team Leader) Tony Trevor and Illona Casey proceeded to 5928 crosscut in the 059 workshop area at approximately 9-15pm. Wild reversed loco number 1783 into 5928 crosscut from the 5902 crosscut and coupled up to a rake of five trucks which were parked in the 5928 crosscut. Trevor and Casey walked from the workshop to the 5928 crosscut and Trevor proceeded down the southside of the rake to a position between the second last and third last truck. Casey walked down the north side of the rake to a position on the other side of the rake from Trevor.
Trevor disconnected the brake air line and safety chain between these two trucks. Casey then took a crow bar and unclipped the coupling between these two trucks. Wild received a signal from Trevor and after checking to see that Casey was clear he drove the loco with the first three trucks attached slowly forward for about two metres and then stopped to ensure that the trucks had parted.
Trevor and Casey climbed onto the back of the third truck.
Wild got out on the side of the loco and looked back over the trucks waiting for their signal. When Wild received their signal he moved the loco slowly forward to take the three trucks around to the east side of the workshop. The slow speed was necessary because of the track condition and the curve.
During this time the two trucks left behind rolled down the grade of 1 in 220 and into the back of the rake. Casey felt something touch her lightly on the back and she took evasive action. Trevor was crushed between the truck bodies. The automatic coupling between the third and fourth truck did not engage and as the loco moved the rake forward the third truck pulled away from the fourth truck and the fourth and fifth trucks came to a halt.
Trevor fell off the third truck and collapsed beside the track.
Recommendations
1. The chief inspector of mines should under the provisions of Part 14.3.3 of the Metalliferous Mining Regulations 1985 modify locomotive operator training to include the provision of an approved training scheme for shunting.
2. Management should devise and implement an effective scheme which will prevent the unplanned movement of rail mounted trucks. We are concerned that a period of thirteen months has expired since this fatality without the effective implementation of suitable chocking devises.
3. The protective cover for the dump rail wheel should be modified to prevent its use as a platform or step. The foothold that is available on the bottom frame of the truck above the dumping door should be modified to prevent its use as a foothold.
4. We are concerned about the effectiveness of responsible supervision for the working of various parts of the mine and would recommend that team leaders are appointed in accordance with the provisions of Section 34(A) and 35 of the Mines Regulation Act 1985
and this would require instruction in their responsibility, authority and accountability.
5. We are concerned about the level of non-compliance with present regulations, mine site rules and standard work procedures. We strongly believe that management and all persons employed should comply with these rules and proceedings and work in accordance with the methods in which they were trained.
6. It is recommended that in the event of any incident resulting in injury or death to any person, members of the inspectorate exercise the provisions of section 25 of the Mines Regulation Act 1964.